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Abstract  
Towards a theory of presuppositions: Kuyperian contributions 
One of the most important themes of contemporary philosophy 
of science was the discovery of presuppositional beliefs and 
frameworks as factors influencing scientific research. This 
article explores the development of a theory of presuppositions 
within Kuyperian philosophy. The authors discussed in this stu-
dy represent a few Kuyperian families: Dooyeweerd, Vollen-
hoven (briefly), Wolterstorff, Klapwijk, Duvenage and Botha. 
The perspective is both historical and systematic. Historically, it 
refers to the main authors who contributed to establishing the 
basic features of such a theory. Systematically, the article tries 
to evaluate the proposals of each contributor by assessing their 
value and limits. In doing so, the author often defends his own 
preferences and indicates the directions to be followed. 
Opsomming 
’n Teorie van vooronderstellings: Kuyperiaanse bydraes 
Een van die belangrikste temas van die huidige wetenskaps-
filosofie is die ontdekking van vooronderstellings, aannames en 
raamwerke as faktore wat wetenskaplike navorsing kan beïn-
vloed. Hierdie artikel verken die ontwikkeling van ’n teorie van 
vooronderstellings binne die Kuyperiaanse filosofie. Die outeurs 
wat in hierdie studie bespreek word, verteenwoordig enkele 
Kuyperiaanse families: Dooyeweerd, Vollenhoven (kortliks), 
Wolterstorff, Klapwijk, Duvenage en Botha. Die perspektief is 
sowel histories as sistematies. Histories word na die belang-
rikste outeurs verwys wat ’n bydrae gelewer het om die basiese 
kenmerke van so ’n teorie te vestig. Sistematies probeer die 
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artikel om die voorstelle van elke bydraer te evalueer deur hulle 
waarde en grense te meet. In die proses verdedig die outeur in 
baie gevalle sy eie voorkeure en dui die rigting aan wat gevolg 
behoort te word. 
1. Introduction  
Twentieth-century philosophy of science has discovered the impor-
tance of presuppositions and debated about premises (Polanyi, 
1946), frameworks (Popper), paradigms and worldviews (Kuhn). In a 
previous article I (Coletto, 2007) explored the development of a 
theory of presuppositions in contemporary (humanist) philosophy of 
science. In the present article I explore the same topic within Chris-
tian (more precisely: Kuyperian-reformed) philosophical circles. I 
(Coletto, 2007:595 ff.) have already sketched some lines of com-
parison between the two schools, therefore I will not return to that 
topic.1 In the following pages I would rather like to focus on (what I 
consider) the strong and weak points of several Kuyperian contri-
butions in this field.  
Before proceeding, it is necessary to specify the meaning of a few 
terms appearing in the title. Although there is a scientific type of 
presuppositions (e.g. axioms and theorems) in this article, the term 
presuppositions/nal always refers to pre-scientific presuppositions 
including all types of beliefs, clusters of beliefs, frameworks, ground 
motives and so on. The term scholarship is also used in an inclusive 
sense, indicating both philosophy and all special disciplines (often 
distinguished as humanities and natural sciences). Finally, the term 
Kuyperian (a synonym of neo-Calvinist) includes several philos-
ophical families, for example the reformational one (Dooyeweerd, 
Vollenhoven and others), the school of reformed epistemology (Wol-
terstorff, Plantinga and others) or the specific current initiated in 
South Africa by H.G. Stoker.  
In the following pages, the authors who have supplied the most 
relevant contributions to the present topic are discussed in historical 
order. Trying to include representatives of several branches of the 
Kuyperian family (and different generations as well) I will focus on 
                                      
1 One of the differences between the two approaches emerges in the following 
pages. In contemporary philosophy of science, presuppositions (e.g. paradigms) 
are discussed especially in relation to the natural sciences. In the reformational 
tradition presuppositions are also related to philosophy and the humanities. 
R. Coletto 
Koers 76(1) 2011:99-118  101 
Dooyeweerd (and briefly Vollenhoven), Wolterstorff, Klapwijk, Du-
venage and Elaine Botha, to whom this article is dedicated.  
As mentioned previously their approaches are outlined and eva-
luated, thus evidencing (what I consider) some of their pros and 
cons. In this process my own preferences and recommendations will 
emerge as well. Let us start our exploration, therefore, from the work 
of Herman Dooyeweerd. 
2. Dooyeweerd  
2.1 Religious ground motives 
The great turning point in Dooyeweerd’s philosophy was the 
discovery of religious ground motives underpinning and conditioning 
the development of philosophic and scientific thinking (Dooyeweerd, 
1984:iv ff.). This discovery was fundamental. On the one hand it 
revealed the inner link between religion2 and theoretical thinking. On 
the other hand it allowed rejecting the idea that scholars can be 
divided in two parties: the religious and the non-religious (i.e. the 
non-prejudiced, objective) ones. Dooyeweerd’s achievement placed 
everyone in the same boat (that of religious conditioning) and clari-
fied that scholarship is structurally the same for all parties involved. 
Dooyeweerd started studying presuppositions and observing their 
function in scientific research in the 1930s. In those years a similar 
project was endorsed by Polanyi (1946:42 ff., 63 ff.).3 
                                      
2 Dooyeweerd’s use of the term religion/ous does not refer only to the “classical” 
religions like Christianity or Islam. It includes also the basic commitments of all 
those who “interpret” life in some way or the other (i.e. all human beings: 
humanists, atheists, positivists, Marxists, etc.). Along this line Clouser (1991:22-
23) argues that “a belief is religious if it is a belief (1) in something(s) or other as 
divine or (2) a belief concerning how humans come to stand in proper relation to 
the divine”. As Clouser defines divine as “having the status of not depending on 
anything else”, it is clear that all human beings have religious beliefs about 
some ultimate reality (e.g. matter, rationality, etc.). 
3 As far as chronology is concerned, Hart (1985:145) points out that Dooyeweerd 
started the process of the recognition and study of presuppositions a few years 
before Polanyi. Polanyi (1946:42) distinguished two classes of presuppositions, 
which he called “general” and “particular assumptions”, as well as a third type 
called “ideals” (e.g. Polanyi, 1946:71). He had a keen sensitivity for the pre-
sence of fundamental commitments of a fiduciary nature in all philosophical 
systems. 
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According to Dooyeweerd (1984, 1:68), the influence of religious 
motives on theoretical thinking is channeled via a threefold 
fundamental idea, which he calls a transcendental (or ground) idea. 
The latter answers three fundamental questions at the very sources 
of philosophy. The first one is the question concerning the origin of 
meaning. The second one deals with the unity (or multiplicity) of 
meaning and the third one deals with the relation of coherence and 
diversity between the different aspects of created reality (Dooye-
weerd, 1984, 1:93-102). 
These three questions are interrelated. According to Dooyeweerd 
(1984, 1:69), acceptance of a unique Origin of all meaning (or of two 
original principles opposed to each other) determines whether one 
accepts or not accepts (see second question) the integral unity of 
meaning at the root of the modal aspects. The answer given to this 
second question determines how one understands the mutual rela-
tion and coherence of meaning of the modal aspects. All this in-
fluences philosophical thinking, but also the special sciences. 
2.2 Sketching Dooyeweerd’s model 
Basically, Dooyeweerd identified two pre-scientific frameworks: reli-
gious ground motives and worldviews. Two questions may be 
asked: what is the difference between these two frameworks and 
how are they positioned (i.e. what role do they play) in Dooye-
weerd’s model? 
Concerning the first question, the main difference between a ground 
motive and a worldview lies in the fact that the former implies a 
claim to universal validity which the latter doesn’t contain. The 
example of Christianity may clarify this point: for the Christian a 
religious ground motive is the heart of the Bible itself, namely the 
motif of “creation fall and redemption in Jesus Christ, through the 
power of the Holy Spirit” (Dooyeweerd, 1966:14). On the other hand, 
the particular worldview of a particular Christian community (e.g. the 
worldview of the neo-Calvinists of the nineteenth century in the Ne-
therlands) may be subjected to revisions, alterations and correc-
tions, precisely in the light of the biblical revelation. Worldviews 
originate in the daily interaction with a particular community and cul-
tural context, in a certain time and place. Their truth-claims are more 
modest. On the other hand, e.g. the biblical ground motive cannot 
be subjected to changes or revisions, and its truth-claims are uni-
versal in nature.  
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This does not mean, of course, that the scientific elaborations of a 
Christian academic community (stemming from the biblical ground 
motive) are infallible. One has to distinguish between the ground 
motive of the biblical religion and the fallible, relative academic 
achievements of a person (or community) committed to that ground 
motive (Dooyeweerd, 1959:69-73). This is true for both natural 
sciences and humanities. 
Concerning the second question (about the position or function of 
the two frameworks in this model), Wolters (1989) offers a fine study 
on different solutions adopted in different Christian traditions. In his 
view Dooyeweerd elaborated an original solution: philosophy and 
worldview are like two trees, both planted on the common soil of reli-
gious commitment. One may agree with Wolters that in this scheme 
a worldview flanks philosophy while a religious motive is their com-
mon ground or soil.  
With a change of metaphor, we may say that in the Dooyeweerdian 
model knowing activities follow two parallel paths. All types of 
knowledge are connected to a religious ground motive (which does 
not mean it is strictly determined by it). However, science develops 
through philosophy and specialises in the particular disciplines 
(which study the world through modal perspectives). Everyday (or 
naive) knowledge develops via a worldview and focuses on concrete 
events and entities.  
The two paths are not necessarily one-way (in the sense that the 
special sciences influence philosophy too), but the initial emphasis 
was mainly on the influence of ground motives on philosophy and of 
philosophy on the special sciences. The reason was that, in those 
years, positivism was still the main school in philosophy of science 
and it was therefore important to highlight the influence of presup-
positions and of metaphysics on science.  
One should notice that in his model Dooyeweerd does not place a 
worldview between ground motive and philosophy, as having a 
mediating role. The reason is that such a move would take us in the 
direction of relativising and historicising Christian scholarship. If one 
keeps in mind the different natures of ground motives and world-
views, it must be admitted that Dooyeweerd’s decision is quite 
judicious (we will return on this issue later). 
In conclusion one may ask whether, in the Dooyeweerdian model, 
worldviews have no contact whatsoever with philosophy (and the 
special sciences). In section 5 Klapwijk’s answer to this question will 
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be examined. In my opinion the possibility should not be completely 
excluded. In fact, worldviews keep “flanking” philosophy. It may be a 
kind of secondary relationship, but it seems to me that the two 
“trees” may still “pollinate” each other. 
Dooyeweerd’s contribution set the tone for the continuation of the 
debate. 
3. Vollenhoven  
Vollenhoven explores the similarities and differences between scien-
tific and non-scientific thinking, and he studies the characteristics of 
worldviews, but he does not propose dramatic alterations to Dooye-
weerd’s views on presuppositions. When his model is illustrated in a 
scheme (cf. Kok, 1988:116) it looks quite similar to the one deve-
loped by the Dooyeweerdian school, with one difference: the role of 
religious ground motives is not equally prominent or relevant. 
Klapwijk (1987:107) points out that Vollenhoven was never too 
fascinated by the idea that we need a bridge between the Bible and 
Christian scholarship. Let us go back to the classical locus in which 
Vollenhoven sets the tone for our discussion: 
If you believe God’s Word, and trust that Word, you obtain a 
philosophy the basis of which is formed by that non-philo-
sophical, non-scientific belief in Holy Scripture and in God. 
(Vollenhoven, 1953:8; 1992:103.) 
Vollenhoven remained equally lukewarm towards the idea that a 
ground motive could concentrate in itself the whole biblical revela-
tion. How can the richness of the Word be included in a formula? It 
could be argued that this attitude favoured the habit of quoting the 
Bible with more freedom in the context of philosophical argumen-
tations, but this remains a debatable issue. 
One should also notice that in more recent times several academics 
in the Vollenhovian school have provided valuable contributions by 
exploring especially the role of worldviews. One should mention, for 
example Van der Walt (2008), Wolters (1989) and Olthuis (1989), 
whose contributions in this field are well known. The work of these 
authors, however, does not aim primarily at introducing radically new 
insights, but especially (though not exclusively) at systematising and 
applying the work already done in this field. 
But let us proceed with order. After Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven 
some time elapsed before someone decided to revive the discussion 
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on presuppositions, although one can say it was never abandoned. 
For a while, the discussion seemed to be settled. Stoker did not pro-
pose different items or arrangements. The second generation of re-
formational thinkers (Mekkes, Popma, Zuidema) did not write much 
on the topic. A text by Van Riessen (1973) did not add particular 
novelties to the debate. The one who threw the next stone in the 
dam was Nicholas Wolterstorff. 
4. Nicholas Wolterstorff 
4.1 The idea of “control beliefs” 
Wolterstorff (1976) started to propose his innovative views on pre-
suppositions and scholarship in his book, Reason within the bounds 
of religion. He was a philosopher influenced by neo-Calvinism 
(Wolterstorff, 1989:68), but also by Scottish Commonsense Realism 
(Thomas Reid and others), which is still quite influential in today’s 
North American Presbyterian circles (cf. Vander Stelt, 1990).  
Wolterstorff’s renewal of a theory of presuppositions is mainly chan-
nelled through the idea of control beliefs. What type of beliefs are 
they? Concerning their function, they control the selection of theo-
ries which are acceptable to a specific scholar (Wolterstorff, 1976: 
63). They also help devising new theories in the sense that they lead 
the scholar in the process. 
Christians, committed as they are to human responsibility, are 
thereby also committed, as I see it, to human freedom; which 
means they will reject purely deterministic accounts in the social 
sciences and search for non-deterministic accounts. (Wolter-
storff, 1989:76.) 
Concerning the nature of control beliefs, Wolterstorff says they 
should be selected among the beliefs constituting the authentic reli-
gious commitment of a Christian. On this point, however, some have 
experienced a difficulty. In fact, Wolterstorff (1976:70) also argues 
that this authentic commitment varies from person to person and 
from time to time. Eventually, says Wolterstorff (1976:71), someone 
should insist that there must be propositions that are part of 
everybody’s Christian commitment in all times. These propositions 
must be few and simple. As it may be expected, some considered 
such a fluctuating view of the Christian religion as rather proble-
matic. For example, Venter (1994:279) sharply remarked that if this 
is the case “it does not make sense to call anything ‘Christian’ any 
longer”. 
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A most important characteristic of control beliefs, according to Wol-
terstorff (1989:76), is that they constitute the true “point of connec-
tion between faith and learning”.4 Neo-Calvinist philosophy, in his 
view, has suggested several other candidates which could account 
for this link, but without success. In particular, Wolterstorff (1989:67 
ff.) rejects the idea that worldviews or faith may perform the linking 
task.  
But are control beliefs better candidates to connect faith and scho-
larship? One may argue, for example, that even after the introduc-
tion of control beliefs it might still be possible to adopt theories that 
are quite at odds with one’s basic commitment (e.g. by emphasising 
one belief instead of another). We have seen, for example, that Wol-
terstorff (1989:76) emphasises human freedom as a guideline for 
the Christian reflection in the social sciences. However, the Huma-
nist arsenal is full of theories in which the ideal of freedom5 plays a 
fundamental role. Will Christian sociologists simply accept them? 
And which ones will they prefer? Wolterstorff might reply that there 
are other beliefs assisting in the selection of theories.6 Unfortunately 
he also admits that they are not particularly related to one’s Chris-
tian commitment (Wolterstorff, 1976:77-79). 
4.2 Beliefs or frameworks? 
The above discussion points towards the idea that single beliefs 
might be too light to support Christian learning. Something more so-
lid may be necessary, something like the frameworks recognised by 
the reformational group. Duvenage (1985:35) too regards the control 
                                      
4 The essay, On Christian learning (Wolterstorff, 1989), dealing to a large extent 
with control beliefs, was republished with the title The point of connection 
between faith and learning (Wolterstorff, 2004:64-86). 
5 According to Dooyeweerd the ideal of freedom corresponds to one of the two 
poles constituting the Humanist ground motive (the two poles are “nature” and 
“freedom”). 
6 Control beliefs are not the only beliefs acknowledged in Wolterstorff ’s theory of 
theorising. He also mentions data beliefs and data-background beliefs (Wol-
terstorff, 1976:61-64). Data beliefs are beliefs about the entities within the scope 
of a theory (Wolterstorff,1976:61). Data-background beliefs constitute the con-
ditions for accepting certain data beliefs (Wolterstorff, 1976:63-64). In this way 
Wolterstorff classifies beliefs into three fundamental categories. Regarding this 
“triad”, Hart (1988:30-31, footnote 25) observes that they constitute something 
not much dissimilar from Polanyi’s tacit, focal and committed dimensions of 
knowing. 
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function as essential, but points out that it is normally attributed to 
worldviews or similar frameworks. 
Indeed, Wolterstorff mentions beliefs more often than frameworks 
(cf. footnote 6). It is also true that he mentions actual and authentic 
Christian commitment, but they can be understood as the sum total 
of the individual beliefs by which they are constituted. It is interesting 
to read his Educating for responsible action (Wolterstorff, 1980) in 
which he uses only one belief (i.e. the biblical idea of responsibility) 
to outline a whole theory of education, in neat distinction from se-
veral other (secular) approaches.  
The achievement is amazing, one must admit. Yet one cannot help 
wondering why is responsibility preferred to other, equally important 
Christian principles or beliefs. Why only one belief and why this 
one? Is it possible to imagine that other beliefs may be equally 
relevant? What helps selecting such beliefs? In other words, in order 
to avoid an atomistic view of presuppositions, the role of frameworks 
calls for attention. Let us proceed examining the topic of the cha-
racteristics of beliefs. 
4.3 Focusing on the function 
When it comes to understanding beliefs and presuppositions, Wol-
terstorff (1976:65, 81) especially emphasises their function. Function 
or role seems to be more fundamental than nature or content, as the 
same belief may assume different functions in different theories or 
contexts, depending on the role it plays, on how it is held. 
This path of research has been explored for example by Stephen 
Wykstra, a scholar in this tradition. Wykstra (s.a.:10-12) shows that if 
we mainly look at the content it is difficult to distinguish metaphysical 
beliefs from religious beliefs, for example. We should rather pay at-
tention at how beliefs are held (Wykstra, s.a.:13). However, during 
his demonstration another factor emerges, namely the importance of 
the context in which beliefs originate and are elaborated. In fact, ac-
cording to Wykstra, metaphysical beliefs “rest on a highly intellectual 
cognitive enterprise”, while religious beliefs “arise more existentially 
getting their primary sustenance from within the religious and spiri-
tual life” (Wykstra, s.a.:14). I would, therefore, agree that the func-
tion is not all. The origin or context of elaboration is also important. 
What about the content (i.e. what beliefs are about)? 
Wykstra (s.a.:7) rejects Clouser’s solution (cf. footnote 2) that a be-
lief is religious when it is about the divine. Although Clouser has 
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distanced himself from the idea that religious beliefs have a specific 
content (i.e. they are about gods, holy books, rituals, etc.), his solu-
tion still insists on content, in the sense that religious beliefs are 
invariantly about the divine. In this regard Wykstra (s.a.:13) re-con-
ducts us to how and why beliefs are held. 
However, I would not exclude that “how” and “why” may be comple-
mented by “what”. Clouser’s argument that those beliefs are inva-
riantly about what is considered non-dependent on something else 
is quite compelling. This approach may be compatible with the pre-
occupation concerning the context (or origin) and, I would say, also 
the questions concerning the nature of beliefs should not be neg-
lected.7 My view is that, in order to understand presuppositions all 
the factors should be considered: the nature, the content, the role 
they play, the context of elaboration and so forth.  
4.4 Positive contributions 
I would like to conclude this section by mentioning what I consider 
the most positive side of Wolterstorff’s contribution to a theory of 
presuppositions. First of all, Wolterstorff identifies several new types 
of beliefs and clarifies their functioning. As a matter of fact, after 
reading Wolterstorff, one realises the complexity of theorising, the 
multiplicity of presuppositions and interactions. In Wolterstorff’s mo-
del, one is confronted with a dynamic element which is missing in 
other models. 
For example, Wolterstorff (1976:72; 1989:77-79) has successfully 
suggested that a Christian view of scholarship should not be uni-
directional or expressivist. In other words, one should avoid focusing 
only on the influence of beliefs on scholarship, as if it was a one way 
direction or as if scholarship may simply be an expression of the 
beliefs and commitments of a community. Theories too influence our 
worldviews and beliefs. Science develops through many paths and 
directions, in a complex and continuous interaction of epistemic 
factors. 
                                      
7 In a rather sharp footnote Hart (1983:246, footnote 57) writes that “for 
Wolterstorff no control belief is essentially a control belief, depending on its role 
in inquiry”. He refers to the problem that Wolterstorff especially focuses on the 
function of beliefs. Furthermore, Hart (1983:232) asks:  
Are there confessional beliefs that are essentially ultimate, and are 
there rational beliefs that are never capable of being legitimate 
confessional beliefs at least for a Christian?  
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One can learn from Wolterstorff that by focusing on a single epis-
temic player (for example a worldview) one can hardly explain a 
complex activity such as the devising and weighing of theories. Al-
though I would like to avoid the atomisation (so to speak) of world-
views (or religious motives) into many single beliefs, I suspect that 
the presuppositions involved in the scientific elaboration of theories 
might interact in more complex and dynamic ways than reforma-
tional philosophy has admitted up to now.8 
5. Jacob Klapwijk 
5.1 The mediating role of worldviews 
Klapwijk made several important contributions to the present dis-
cussion. He pleaded for more communication and exchange of 
ideas. Klapwijk (1986:143, footnote 9) stated quite clearly, for 
example, that he doesn’t like Kuhn’s view of worldviews (i.e. para-
digms) in which ideas are basically held captive within a certain 
framework and cannot be communicated to those who argue from 
within another cage. Klapwijk (1986) prefers to think that ideas can 
be offered, exchanged, transformed and eventually appropriated. 
On the other hand, Klapwijk pleaded for a more hermeneutic atti-
tude. He, therefore, suggested that worldviews should not be rele-
gated to the side of religious ground motives. Worldviews should be 
regarded as mediators between fundamental commitments and 
scientific elaborations. In other words, worldviews have a mediating 
role to play between religious ground motives and theoretical 
thinking (Klapwijk, 1987:108). 
Klapwijk’s intellectual honesty led him to admit that the proposed 
move represented a new direction within reformational philosophy, 
one which could legitimately prompt the concerns of fellow philo-
sophers. In fact, he (Klapwijk, 1987:109) recognised that the intro-
duction of worldviews as mediators might have the effect of rela-
tivising one’s position, of reducing its claim to universal validity (cf. 
section 2.2). Also, the advantage which Klapwijk wanted to achieve 
is that such an arrangement makes philosophy more hermeneutic, in 
                                      
8 I have discussed a few other aspects of Wolterstorff’s philosophy of scholarship 
in two different articles. Concerning the relationship between the devising and 
weighing of theories, see Coletto (2009:401-405). On the influence of theorising 
on religious commitment, see Coletto (2010a:20-21). In the latter article one 
finds comments on several of Wolterstorff’s critique to the reformational philo-
sophy of scholarship. 
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other words more capable of dealing with the here and now, with 
concrete problems, the struggles of concrete people which may be 
lost in a more universal approach. 
5.2 Ground motives and worldviews  
Another interesting proposal from Klapwijk concerned the religious 
ground motives. In his view, what Dooyeweerd indicated as ground 
motives, were in fact worldviews (Klapwijk, 1987:109). According to 
Klapwijk, Dooyeweerd borrowed the idea of ground motives from 
Kuyper, who spoke of several fundamental life-systems. Concerning 
the western world, Kuyper discussed four of them: paganism, Ro-
man Catholicism, modernism and Calvinism (the most consistent ex-
pression of the biblical life view). Klapwijk argues that Dooyeweerd 
must have drawn the idea from there, for he also presents his four 
systems, with the difference that under his pen they became 
religious.9  
At this point, however, a question emerges: Do ground motives need 
the mediation of worldviews or are they worldviews? Klapwijk has 
defended both theses, but on this point a choice seems to be 
necessary, as one thesis excludes the other. 
5.3 Sequentiality and consistency 
Klapwijk discussed many presuppositional frameworks and this is 
indeed a merit. However, here we have to notice an inclination to 
present them in a way which displays a clear sequentiality. In other 
words, it is difficult to avoid the impression that those frameworks 
are placed in a sequence, one after the other. They look like the 
rings of a chain, each one connected to the previous and to the fol-
lowing one (but without much connection to the others). The pro-
blems related to mediation were already mentioned by Dooyeweerd 
(1959:66) and Geertsema (1987:146) discusses the same issue in 
relation to Klapwijk.  
We may define sequentiality as the inclination to multiply the media-
tors. Klapwijk’s (1984:166) list includes “one’s religious commitment, 
personal conception of life, worldview and the practical ethos of 
                                      
9 Although it does not constitute a refutation of Klapwijk’s argument, one might 
observe that the ground motives explored by Dooyeweerd are at least five. In 
fact, he discusses the ground motive of Roman culture as well (Dooyeweerd, 
1980:22 ff.). 
R. Coletto 
Koers 76(1) 2011:99-118  111 
one’s community”. (The chain continues at the scientific level with 
the mediation of philosophy!) 
A study clarifying which frameworks play an active role in scholar-
ship (eventually which terms are simply synonyms) and what func-
tion they are supposed to have, would be desirable. I also auspicate 
that Klapwijk’s old and new proposals may be connected and sorted 
out so that a clearer picture may emerge. Klapwijk’s writing range 
over more than four decades. Across the years some proposals 
were abandoned, others were modified and I, for one, have dif-
ficulties tracing a coherent development of the different ideas.  
In more recent times the discussion about religious ground motives 
seems to have been substituted (e.g. Klapwijk, 2008:200) by a dis-
cussion about faith. One may wonder whether the distinction be-
tween (modal) faith and (central) religion – a leading star for neo-
Calvinist philosophy – has been abandoned too. Concerning world-
views for example, in some cases they are said to “derive from faith” 
(Klapwijk, 2008:196), while in others they are the result of “religious 
expectations” (Klapwijk, 2008:205). Still in other cases (Klapwijk, 
2008:200, fig. 10.1) worldviews disappear from the picture and 
scientific thinking seems to interact directly with faith/religion. Even 
in this case, therefore, a good clarification of Klapwijk’s views, in 
which past and present arguments are connected, would be a good 
service to our theory of presuppositions. 
In my view the best contribution by Klapwijk in this field remains the 
idea that worldviews have something to do with scientific reflection. 
This is something more than Dooyeweerd was prepared to admit. 
Their influence, therefore, should be recognised and regulated, 
rather than ignored or denied. The way Klapwijk has tried to achieve 
this result (i.e. by making worldviews mediators), has raised several 
objections. However, the basic idea, in my opinion, remains valid 
and should be pursued further.10 My guess is that, if the chain or 
mediation metaphor (or the concentric circles of Klapwijk, 2008:200, 
fig. 10.1) could be substituted by a more dynamic one, many 
elements in Klapwijk’s model would fall into place. In this respect, 
                                      
10 I have discussed other aspects of Klapwijk’s philosophy of scholarship in 
different sections of a few articles. For example, concerning his view of the role 
of biblical perspectives in Christian scholarship, see Section 5 in Coletto 
(2010b). Concerning his view of interaction with non-Christian scholarship, see 
Coletto (2010a:12-16). 
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something can be learnt from a South African scholar working in the 
tradition of H.G. Stoker. 
6. Benonie Duvenage 
Good ideas do not only come from Europe or North America. In the 
mid 1980s a brief but extremely interesting sketch of a theory of 
presuppositions was presented in South Africa by Duvenage (1985). 
The latter devised a model in which the problem of sequentiality 
seems to be drastically reduced and the interaction of the different 
epistemic players becomes much more dynamic. He represents the 
scientific process through the image of a spiral, in which three levels 
or foci are identified. On the wider part of the spiral is the macro-
focus, followed by a mesofocus and by a microfocus at the bottom 
(narrower) part of the spiral. 
Following this model, a scholar should take into account that the 
levels of scientific investigation are many, but connected to each 
other (Duvenage, 1985:31-36). The scientist can move from one le-
vel (focus) to another and back again. In each level we find relevant 
reference points or, as Duvenage calls them, “perspectives” or “vi-
sions” (Duvenage, 1985:33).  
What are the relevant perspectives in each context? I will simply 
quote Duvenage’s (1985:34) sketch. 
Microfocus: scientific knowledge of a discipline (e.g. eco-
nomics). Pre-knowledge about the field investigated. Knowl-
edge about the status of research in the relevant field. 
Mesofocus: relevant Scriptural data (e.g. stewardship). Philos-
ophy of the particular discipline (e.g. economics). Theories 
about the field (e.g. behaviorism). 
Macrofocus: Scriptural perspectives. Convictions of lifeview. 
Philosophical points of departure (e.g. ontology, anthropology, 
doctrine of society).  
Interesting in this model is that on each level one finds scientific and 
pre-scientific players interacting. The nature of the different players 
is not blurred, yet elements that are often considered mediators (e.g. 
philosophy, worldviews) are regarded as interacting together at 
different levels, in a model which is convincingly dynamic. 
One may still object that in Duvenage’s system the channels to be 
followed are prescribed a bit rigidly, or according to a prefixed se-
quence. The spiral metaphor tends to soften the sequentiality, but 
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one may wonder whether a certain hierarchic arrangement does not 
remain. In other words, one may, for example, still ask the question 
whether the convictions of life view (which are operative at 
macrofocus level) are also directly available to the special sciences 
(microfocus) or only through the philosophy of a particular discipline 
which operates at the mesofocus level.  
When Duvenage (1985:37-38) says that scriptural perspectives 
must first be elaborated into an ontology before they can play a role 
in scholarship, he seems to prescribe a certain rigidity in the 
sequences to be followed. Duvenage’s scheme should be clarified a 
bit more, but I consider it quite valuable in many respects. 
This model portrays scholarship as a kind of network of epistemic 
factors. An objection which is often raised in such cases, is that the 
traditional role of some epistemic players simply gets lost and in the 
end all the players join in a sort of undifferentiated carnival. On this 
point Frame (1987:89) reminds us that we don’t need to flatten our 
epistemological views by supposing that all the presuppositional 
frameworks (and disciplines) operating in a certain system have the 
same function and authority. Duvenage (1985:18) agrees with this 
view and shows that, even in his dynamic model, the specific func-
tions of the epistemic players don’t need to be blurred.  
Let us now complete our survey by considering Elaine Botha’s 
contribution. 
7. Elaine Botha 
Elaine Botha renewed the discussions in this field by focusing 
especially on the role of metaphors in science. I must admit that it is 
a territory which is less familiar to me. A much more extensive study 
would be necessary to survey her work in those fields and to trace 
the numerous connections with the work of Boyd, Kuhn, Black, 
Johnson, et cetera. Nevertheless, metaphors do not exclude the 
presence of presuppositional frameworks. On the contrary, they pre-
suppose it. I will, therefore, attempt a few notes on her work on 
presuppositions. 
In a specific text Botha (2002:214) indirectly provides a list of the 
epistemic players which she recognises and considers relevant in 
relation to theorising. They are one’s fiduciary commitment, a world-
view and, on the scientific side, philosophy, a scientific worldview 
and the special sciences. This is the basic Dooyeweerdian approach 
with something new, namely the idea of a scientific worldview. Here 
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Botha (2002:214, footnote 2) seems to have something similar to 
Kuhn’s paradigm in mind. In fact, Kuhn speaks of revolutions as 
worldview changes and his paradigms/worldviews are at least in part 
scientific.  
On the reformational side Stafleu (1987:242-249) also supports the 
idea of a scientific worldview. Unfortunately, on this point they both 
provide limited information and one would definitely like to learn 
more. Some of the questions arising might be the following: Is a 
scientific worldview supposed to be back-up only by the natural 
sciences (as Kuhn’s paradigms)? What about the humanities? Do 
they also have their scientific worldview? What would Botha reply to 
those philosophers (e.g. Strauss, 2009:196) who regard philosophy 
itself as a scientific worldview? She seems to have this issue in mind 
in Botha (2007:214). We can only trust that Botha will explain the 
idea further at a later stage. 
I regard Botha’s contribution as being fundamentally Dooyeweer-
dian/reformational. From Dooyeweerd she has inherited the very 
basic idea that religion11 works, not only before science, but within 
science. This is an insight which shapes her approach in a fun-
damental way. In fact, by arguing that fiduciary presuppositions work 
within science, she endorses the strong thesis according to which 
not only science and scholarship are influenced by philosophical as-
sumptions, but the latter are expressions of ultimate religious com-
mitments (Botha, 2007:181). While many would grant that religion 
parallels or precedes science she follows the reformational tradition 
along the path leading to the inner reformation of scholarship. 
Yet, Botha has often incorporated several lessons by predecessors 
and colleagues from other Kuyperian families in her approach. Lack 
of space prevents me from mentioning her appreciation of insights 
from Van Riessen or Stoker. Let us only mention her interaction with 
Wolterstorff’s idea of control beliefs (e.g. Botha, 2006:28-30). She 
has often shown appreciation for that idea. At the same time, 
however, she is careful not to reach an atomistic conception of such 
beliefs and therefore she insists that clusters and even hierarchies 
of beliefs should be recognised (Botha, 2007:212-214). One should 
be careful not to be unilateral or partial in one’s approach. 
                                      
11 On the nature of religion, Botha follows the Dooyeweerd-Clouser path (footnote 
2) without losing sight of the distinction between (central) religion and (modal) 
faith. In particular she (e.g. Botha, 2007:140) distinguishes between a narrow 
and a broader sense of religion. 
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Furthermore, although she agrees with Wolterstorff that the function 
of beliefs is very important, she acknowledges that sometimes con-
trol beliefs assume (illegitimately) the role of religious beliefs. At this 
point she introduces a distinction: while this operation is possible in 
practice, it is not automatically legitimate. Holding those beliefs as 
religious beliefs, constitutes a transgression of the proper nature and 
role of those beliefs, an absolutisation in which they become myths 
(Botha, 1996; 2007:154). While her understanding of religion allows 
her to include those positions within the religious ones, she does al-
so discern a normative and an anti-normative use of beliefs (Botha, 
1993:44).  
Finally, there is a special skill to be admired in Botha’s contribution, 
namely the ability to connect reformational ideas and terms to terms 
and ideas already used in humanist and secular circles. Many of the 
terms she uses, e.g. root-metaphor and conveyance are borrowed 
from that environment and placed in a reformational perspective. I 
think this has the advantage of creating bridges of dialogue and 
interaction.  
That this is also risky, has been said many times and it is true: one 
cannot simply formally deal with philosophical ideas. In time they 
might reveal like the Trojan horse their hidden and lethal implica-
tions. But then, any investment implies a risk. If the alternative is 
burying one’s talents under the ground, Elaine Botha has preferred 
trading in new territories. As far as I can see, she has adopted an 
approach which may be called “convivial”, but never becomes ec-
lectic. She has preserved her presuppositional and philosophical 
identity, which is the only solid basis for genuine dialogue. 
8. Conclusion 
Hopefully this brief contribution may stimulate further research in the 
theory of presuppositions. The themes and problems emerging in 
the pages above may also indicate some of the avenues of this 
research.  
In the meantime, I hope this brief historical survey may be of some 
help to readers who are not familiar with this particular philosophical 
tradition. For those readers, this survey may also constitute an 
introduction to Elaine Botha’s work, for knowing the tradition better 
should also help understanding her work better. To those, on the 
other hand, who are already well acquainted with neo-Calvinist phi-
losophy, I would like to suggest that Botha’s work has not yet re-
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ceived the attention it deserves. There is an opportunity to discover 
new riches of the Kuyperian legacy. 
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